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We have demonstrated quantum key distribution (QKD) [1] over a 10-km, 1-airmass 
atmospheric range during daylight and at night. Secret random bit sequences of the quality 
required for the cryptographic keys used to initialize secure communications devices were 
transferred at practical rates with realistic security. By identifying the physical parameters 
that determine the systems secrecy efficiency, we infer that free-space QKD will be 
practical over much longer ranges under these and other atmospheric and instrumental 
conditions.  
Cryptography allows two parties (Alice and Bob) to render their communications unintelligible to a 
third party (Eve), provided they both possess a secret random bit sequence, known as a cryptographic key, 
which is required as an initial parameter in their encryption devices [2]. Secure key distribution is then 
essential; Eve must not be able to obtain even partial knowledge of the key. Key distribution using a secure 
channel (trusted couriers) is effective but cumbersome in practice, potentially vulnerable to insider betrayal 
and may not even be feasible in some applications. In contrast quantum key distribution (QKD) [1] uses 
single-photon communications to generate and transfer new keys on-demand with security based on 
fundamental quantum principles in concert with information-theoretically secure protocols [3]; Eve can do no 
better than to guess the key. QKD offers long-term security superior to public-key based key transfer systems 
[4]. QKD would be especially useful if it could be performed reliably across line-of-sight paths through the 
atmosphere [4, 5]. Free-space QKD has previously been demonstrated over laboratory [6, 7] and modest 
outdoor [8, 9, 10] distances. More recently, the feasibility of free-space QKD over kilometer-scale distances 
has been demonstrated in both daylight [11] and at night [11, 12]. In this paper we report the first 
demonstration of the transfer of cryptographic quality secret keys at practical rates during both day and night 
using QKD across a 10-km air path whose extinction, optics and background are representative of potential 
applications. We also develop a methodology for extrapolating these results to other ranges under other 
atmospheric and instrumental conditions. 
In our realization of the BB84 QKD protocol [1] Alice (the transmitter) sends a sequence of random 
bits over a quantum channel to Bob (the receiver) that are randomly encoded as linearly polarized single 
photons in either of two conjugate polarization bases with (0, 1) = (H, V), where H (V) denotes 
horizontal (vertical) polarization (respectively), in the rectilinear basis, or (0, 1) = (+45º, -45º), where 
+45º and -45º denote the polarization directions in the diagonal basis. Bob randomly analyzes the 
polarization of each arriving photon in either the (H, V) or the (+45º, -45º) basis, assigning the corresponding 
bit value to detected photons. Then using a public channel, which is authenticated but assumed to be 
susceptible to passive monitoring by Eve, he informs Alice in which time slots he detected photons, but 
without revealing the bit value he assigned to each one. The sequence of bits detected by Bob and the 
corresponding bit sequence transmitted by Alice form partially correlated raw keys. (See Figure 1.) Then 
  1 
LA-UR-02-449   
using the public channel Alice reveals her basis choice for each bit of her raw key, but not the bit value. 
Bob communicates back the time slots of the bits in his raw key for which he used the same basis as Alice. In 
an ideal system Alices transmitted bits and the results of Bobs measurements on this random, 50% portion 
of the raw key, known as the sifted key, are perfectly correlated; they discard the raw key bits for which 
Bob used the wrong basis. In practice Bobs sifted key contains errors. Fundamental quantum principles 
ensure that Eve is both limited in how much information she may obtain by eavesdropping on the quantum 
communications, and that she cannot do so without introducing a disturbance (errors) in Bobs sifted key 
from which Alice and Bob can deduce a rigorous upper bound on leaked information. Alice and Bob 
determine this bound after reconciling their sifted keys using post facto error correction [13] over their public 
channel, but at the price of leaking additional (side) information to Eve. From their partially-secret reconciled 
keys Alice and Bob extract the shorter, final secret key on which they agree with overwhelming probability 
and on which Eves expected information is much less than one bit [14] after a final stage of privacy 
amplification [3] using further public channel communications. BB84 with ideal single-photon signals is 
unconditionally secure [15]. 
The atmosphere is not birefringent at optical wavelengths and so can function as a quantum channel for 
the transmission of BB84 polarized single-photon states. Atmospheric transmittance and the availability of 
high-efficiency, low-noise single-photon detectors (SPDs) strongly constrain the operational wavelength, 
with 772-nm offering the highest secret bit rates with current technology [5]. Challenges to implementing 
free-space QKD include the background radiance, which is a strong error source even at night [11], that 
varies over several orders of magnitude on time scales of the order of hours, and atmospheric turbulence 
which introduces random variations in the quantum channel transmission on 10-100-ms time-scales. These 
features of the free-space quantum channel also present challenges to extrapolating the performance of QKD 
from results at one range and one time-of-day to other ranges and other times-of-day. Our implementation of 
free-space QKD effectively deals with the physics challenges of the atmospheric quantum channel and we 
have developed a formalism that allows system performance to be extrapolated into other regimes. 
Our free-space QKD system uses spectral, spatial and temporal filtering to render the background 
tractable [4, 5, 10, 11]. It has no active polarization switching elements, both as a security feature and for 
design simplicity, and can operate across ranges up to 30 km (limited by the range of our 1 Mbit s-1 wireless 
Ethernet public channel). On each cycle of a 1-MHz clock the transmitter (Alice) emits a ~ 1-ns, few mW, 
1,550-nm timing pulse. After a 100-ns delay, two secret random bits generated by a cryptographic monolithic 
randomizer [16] determine which one of four temperature-controlled data diode lasers emits a ~ 1-ns, 
772-nm optical pulse with one of the BB84 polarizations [1] and an average photon number, µ, (we assume 
Poissonian photon number statistics and µ < 1 throughout) that is launched towards the receiver (Bob). (See 
Figure 2.) At Bob the timing pulse is detected by a photodiode, to set up an ~ 1-ns timing slot in which a 
QKD data pulse is expected. An 18-cm Cassegrain telescope, whose field of view is restricted to ~ 220-µrad 
by a spatial filter, collects the 772-nm data pulse, passes it through a 0.1-nm wide interference filter 
(transmission ηfilt ~ 0.6), and directs it into an optical system where its polarization is randomly analyzed in 
one of the BB84 bases. SPDs, one for each of the four BB84 polarizations, register the result. (The SPDs are 
based on passively-quenched EG&G model #C30902S silicon avalanche photodiodes operated at a 
temperature of -20°C, with a single-photon detection efficiency of ηdet ~ 0.61, and a dark count rate of 
~ 1.6 kHz. Lower dark count rates ~ 100 Hz would be possible with other detectors.) After a 1-s quantum 
transmission of 106 bits, a 6-s public channel communication is required to produce the sifted key. Cameras in 
Alice and Bob provide rudimentary visual authentication to protect against a man-in-the-middle attack. 
Cryptographic authentication [2, 14, 17] would be included in a complete QKD-enabled secure 
communications system. 
We located Alice at an elevation of 2,760 m on Pajarito Mountain, Los Alamos, NM, (35° 53.489 N, 
106° 22.647 W) with Bob located near to our laboratory (35° 52.222 N, 106° 16.312 W), at an elevation of 
2,153 m, pointing towards Alice (azimuthal direction = 284° true, elevation angle = 3.5°). The 9.81-km 
Alice-Bob air path had an average beam height above the terrain of ~ 140 m and a calculated atmospheric 
transmittance of ηtrans = 0.81 [18].  We operated the system for several hours on each of several days during 
both full daylight, with 0.2 < <µ>day < 0.8, and at night with 0.1 < <µ>night < 0.2. During a 1-s quantum 
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transmission, the probability for a transmitted bit to enter the sifted key, Psif, depends on the average photon 
number of the optical pulses, µ, the efficiency of the atmospheric transmission and the receivers detection 
efficiency. In the regime in which we operate, where the signal-to-background ratio is large and the 
probability of multi-detection events is much less than the probability of single-detection events, we may 
write, , where η( 84 det1 expsif trans geo rec filt BBP µη η η η η η≈ − − ) geo (~ 3 - 12%) is the 1-s average geometric 
capture efficiency of data pulses by Bob, and ηrec ~ 0.47 is the transmission of Bobs receiver optics with the 
exception of the 50/50 beamsplitter that provides the random choice of QKD polarization measurement basis, 
whose transmission/reflection coefficient is ηBB84 = 0.5. Taking into account the 1-MHz clock rate, the system 
produced n = 106Psif ~ 100  2,000 sifted key bits per 1-s quantum transmission. Errors in Bobs sifted key 
were overwhelmingly caused by (unpolarized) background photons in daylight and by detector dark noise at 
night. We quantified these sources of errors by operating the system at µ = 0 (zero transmitted photon 
number) to produce a sifted key formed entirely from detections of background photons and detector dark 
counts at Bobs receiver. We found that in each 1-s, µ = 0 transmission, each of Bobs four detectors 
registered approximately equal numbers of detections, of which approximately one half were in the wrong 
basis, and the balance of the detections contributed bits to a sifted key that were divided roughly equally 
between correct bits and errors. With both transmitter and receiver in afternoon sunlight we observed 
C ~ 50 sifted key errors per detector in a 1-s, µ = 0 transmission, corresponding to a radiance of 
~ 2 mW cm-2 µm-1 str-1. (Under these conditions Alice and Bob produced background-generated sifted keys 
containing ~ 400 bits of which ~ 200 of the bits in Bobs sifted key were errors.) In reduced daylight 
(transmitter in shadow, receiver in direct sunlight) this dropped to C ~ 5 . At night, even though the 
background radiance is at least a factor of one million less than in daylight, we found C ~ 1  2, owing to 
detector dark noise. Therefore, for µ ≠ 0 transmissions, the sifted key bit error rate (BER) can be written as 
4 optC n CDε µη≈ ≈ , where ηopt = ηtransηgeo is the atmospheric quantum channels 1-s average efficiency, C 
has the value appropriate to the time-of-day of the transmission as described above, and 
6
84 det4 10 4.7 10rec filt BBη η η η
− ≈ × 5−D ≈ ×  is a constant, receiver-dependent factor. (Errors caused by 
polarization misalignments and imperfections were estimated to contribute < 0.5% to the sifted key BER.) 
We note that the sifted key BER, which is one of the relevant quantities in determining the overall QKD 
system performance, is a function of: the average photon number, µ, which is characteristic of the transmitter; 
the quantity ηopt/C, which characterizes the quality of the atmospheric quantum channel; and the constant, 
receiver-dependent quantity, D. In what follows we will find that µ and ηopt/C are particularly useful 
independent variables for predicting system performance. (The quantity ηopt/C is proportional to the signal-to-
noise ratio that the system would have for producing sifted bits, scaled to a notional photon number of µ = 1. 
We have chosen to use ηopt/C as an independent variable because this quantity isolates the dependence of the 
systems performance on the atmospheric channel properties, which are not under our direct control, into a 
single quantity whose value is determined from measured quantities.) 
For example, on 4 October 2001 under cloudless New Mexico skies between 17:42 MDT, with Bob in 
direct sunlight, and sunset at 18:44 MDT we made 207 1-s quantum transmissions (207 million random bits 
transmitted by Alice) that had an average photon number of <µ>day ≈ 0.49 with a standard deviation of 0.12, a 
channel efficiency of <ηopt>day = 4.1%±1.2%, and channel parameter <ηopt/C>day = 0.0026±0.0017. From 
these we obtained 394,004 sifted key bits (<Psif>day = (1.9±0.8)×10-3), with an average BER of <ε>day = 
5.0%±2.2%. (See Table 1 for an example of a daylight sifted key.) Then between 18:44 MDT and 19:29 
MDT from a further 236 1-s quantum transmissions with an average photon number of <µ>night ≈ 0.14 with a 
standard deviation of 0.02, a channel efficiency of <ηopt>night = 6.6%±1.8%, and channel parameter 
<ηopt/C>night = 0.017±0.007, we obtained 192,925 sifted key bits (<Psif>night = (0.82±0.21)×10-3), with an 
average BER of <ε>night = 2.1%±0.7%. (See Figure 3.) 
Alice and Bob reconcile their n-bit sifted keys from each 1-s quantum transmission using the interactive 
bisective search algorithm [6, 13] to correct Bobs errors by dividing the sifted key from each 1-s quantum 
transmission into words and the parity of each word is publicly communicated. Words whose parities do not 
match are then repeatedly sub-divided and the parity of the subwords publicly communicated to locate and 
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correct an error. The key is then randomly shuffled and the process repeated until no parity mismatches occur 
on two successive rounds. Alice and Bob then possess n-bit reconciled keys that agree with very high 
probability; they have a reliable estimate of the BER of the sifted key, but they have revealed parity (side) 
information about the sifted key that is approximately 19% greater than the Shannon limit of 
( ) ( ) (2 2log 1 log 1f )ε ε ε ε= − + − − ε
)
 bits per bit of sifted key, on sifted keys of ~ 104 bits for the BERs we 
encounter. 
Our first line of defense for Alice and Bob against eavesdropping is similar to that of Reference [6]. To 
protect against opportunities presented by multi-photon signals [19] (e.g. a beamsplitting attack) Alice and 
Bob assume that the fraction ( µ≈  of sifted key bits in each 1-s transmission that originated from the 
transmitter as multi-photon pulses could have been faithfully identified by Eve [6]. They attribute all Bobs 
errors to Eve having performed an intercept/resend attack in the Breidbart basis on the portion ( )4 1ε µ≈ −  
of sifted key bits that originated as single-photon pulses [6]. The number of secret bits that Alice and Bob can 
extract from n reconciled key bits is then ( ) ( ) ( ), , , 1.19F n n R fµ ε µ ε ε s ≈ − −   bits [20], where s is a 
safety factor [3, 14], and ( ) ( )24 log 1.5ε,R µ −1µ ε ≈ −  is Eves collision entropy per bit [3] of the sifted key. 
(If the reconciled key has any bias  more zeroes than ones or vice-versa  they also reduce the 
collision entropy appropriately to compensate for the information that this would provide to Eve.) From each 
positive-F 1-s quantum transmission Alice and Bob produce an F-bit final secret key using privacy 
amplification by public communications [3]. They form the elements of their final secret keys as the parities 
of F random (but publicly specified) subsets of their n-bit reconciled keys.i The protocol fails to produce a 
secret key if F < 0. Eves expected (Shannon) information on the final key ( )bits2 ln 2s−<  is < 10-6 bits for 
s = 20, independent of the length of the final key. We define two figures of merit: the privacy amplification 
efficiency (the number of secret bits per sifted bit), Psif→secret = F/n, for F > 0, and 0 otherwise; which 
characterizes the efficiency of the information-theoretic parts of the QKD procedure, and the secrecy 
efficiency (the number of final secret bits per transmitted bit), Psecret = Psif Psif→secret for F > 0, and 0 
otherwise, which characterizes the performance of the entire QKD system. (See Figure 1.) In our system, 
which operates at a 1-MHz clock rate, the total number of secret bits that can be produced from a 1-s quantum 
transmission is therefore 106Psecret. 
First we consider Psif→secret , which depends only on µ and ηopt/C in the regime in which we operate where 
the safety factor, s, is much less than the number of sifted key bits, n. Remarkably, only certain ranges of µ 
and ηopt/C values allow any secret bits to be extracted from the corresponding sifted keys [11]: no secret bit 
yield is possible for channel parameters smaller than ηopt/C = 0.0016 for any value of µ with our system. (See 
Figure 4.) Of the 207 daylight 1-s quantum transmission on 4 October, 2001, 94 lie in this zero-yield region. 
For larger values of ηopt/C there is a range of µ-values, µmin < µ < µmax, (where µmin and µmax are functions of 
ηopt/C) consistent with non-zero secret bit yield. For µ < µmin the sifted key BER is so large that no secret bits 
can be extracted because of the large amount of information potentially leaked to correct errors and through 
intercept/resend eavesdropping. As µ increases from µmin the sifted key BER decreases, and the yield of secret 
bits initially increases, but as µ increases further so much information is potentially available to Eve through 
multi-photon pulses that the secret bit yield starts to decrease, reaching zero at some value µmax. The 
remaining 113 of our daylight 1-s transmissions and all of our night transmissions lie in this allowed region, 
which shrinks to zero for ηopt/C = (ηopt/C)min = 0.0016 at µ ≈ 0.45 with ε ≈ 5.7%. This observation allows us 
                                                          
i With very small probability, two errors may remain in Bobs reconciled key after error correction. Privacy 
amplification then has the effect of producing final keys in which half of Bobs bits disagree with Alices. 
Obviously, such keys cannot be used. Fortunately, this rare occurrence can be detected with high probability 
by performing a final key check, in which we sacrifice a few final key bits and compare them to ensure that 
the keys agree, leading to a small reduction in the overall secrecy efficiency. This key check would be 
included in the authentication procedure [17] in a complete system [14], but this was not implemented when 
the data in this paper was taken. 
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to specify the limiting atmospheric channel conditions under which QKD is possible with this system (and for 
other systems by scaling the relevant parameters) and as we will see later, to infer the maximum range under 
different background conditions. The average privacy amplification efficiencies for extracting secret bits from 
the 4 October sifted keys were: <Psif→secret>day = 0.26±0.12 for the non-zero secret bit yield daylight 
transmissions only; <Psif→secret>day = 0.06±0.25 when the zero-yield daylight transmissions were included; and 
<Psif→secret>night = 0.64±0.07 for the night transmissions.  
The secrecy efficiency Psecret, is the most relevant figure of merit for overall system performance. This 
quantity determines the total number of secret bits that Alice and Bob can produce per unit time, and through 
its dependence on the relevant independent parameters we can determine how to optimize its value. In 
daylight we achieved a maximum secrecy efficiency of Psecret, max = 7.0×10-4, an average value of <Psecret>day = 
(3.2±1.4)×10-4 for the non-zero yield transmissions, and <Psecret>day = 1.5×10-4 including all daylight 
transmissions. The corresponding values at night were Psecret, max = 8.0×10-4 and <Psecret>night = (4.2±1.4)×10-4. 
(See Figure 5 and Table 1 for an example of a final secret key.) The total 50,783 of daylight final secret key 
bits, and the total 118,064 of night final secret key bits passed the FIPS 140-2 cryptographic randomness tests 
[21] as well as the 5-bit version of the Maurer universal statistical test for cryptographic random numbers 
[22]. The FIPS tests, which we also apply to the random numbers produced by Alices randomizer, require 
samples containing 20,000 bits and specify statistical significance levels for: the proportions of 1s (monobit 
test); the frequencies with which all possible four-bit groups occur (poker test); and the frequencies with 
which consecutive sequences of 0s (gaps) and 1s (runs) occur (runs test). Maurers test, which 
requires large samples of bits, sets statistical significance levels for the intervals between repetitions of m-bit 
blocks of bits. Our 4 October 2001 data provided enough secret bits to perform this test for m = 5. 
We also consider protecting Alice and Bob from two eavesdropping attacks in which Eve would take 
complete control of the atmospheric quantum channel. First, we consider the possibility that Eve could 
perform a technologically-feasible version of an unambiguous state discrimination (USD) attack [6, 23, 24] to 
uniquely identify the polarization of a portion of the optical pulses containing three photons emerging from 
Alices transmitter. Eve could couple all of Alices optical pulses with perfect optical efficiency into a 
lossless version of Bobs receiver. Whenever precisely three of Eves single-photon detectors are triggered, 
she can uniquely identify the pulses polarization as the polarization associated with the single detector that 
was triggered in one of the bases. Using a conventional channel Eve could then communicate the polarization 
to a transmitter similar to Alices located adjacent to Bobs receiver, and fabricate an optical pulse of the 
same polarization. Eve would simply block all other data pulses. Eve would then know precisely every bit in 
Alices sifted key and would be able to evade detection provided she did not reduce Bobs raw key rate below 
the expected value. This is only possible if the emission rate of three-photon pulses from the transmitter that 
Eve can identify is larger than the expected single-photon arrival rate at the receiver: 2 32 optµ η>
2
. None of 
our positive secrecy efficiency data lies in this region and so our data is secure against this attack. (Our 
system can tolerate up to 21dB of atmospheric channel loss at µ = 0.5, and up to 31dB of loss for µ = 0.15 
while maintaining security against this form of eavesdropping.) Second, we consider the possibility of an 
even stronger, photon number splitting (PNS) attack. In the version of the attack that we consider Eve would 
block all single photon pulses from Alice, split off and store one photon from each multi-photon pulse while 
sending on the remaining photons to Bob over a lower-loss channel, and then measure the polarization of her 
stored photon once Alice announces her basis choices. (We do not consider the possibility that Eve could 
increase the efficiency of Bobs detectors [25].) As with the USD attack considered above, Eve would then 
know precisely every bit in Alices sifted key and would be able to evade detection provided she did not 
reduce Bobs raw key rate below the expected value. This would be feasible if the emission rate of multi-
photon pulses from the transmitter is larger than the single-photon arrival rate at the receiver ( optµ η> ) [25], 
which imposes a stronger limit on the allowable photon numbers than for the USD attack. However, Eve 
would require yet-to-be-invented technology: an optical-photon-number quantum non-demolition 
measurement capability, a quantum memory and a lower-loss quantum channel to Bob. Nevertheless, 
approximately half of the 4 October, 2001 night 1-s transmissions (whose 107,250 sifted bits yielded 70,577 
final secret bits) are secure against this version of the PNS. 
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We have demonstrated that free-space QKD is possible in daylight or at night, protected against 
intercept/resend, beamsplitting and USD eavesdropping (and even PNS eavesdropping at night), over a 
10-km, 1-airmass path, which is representative of potential ground-to-ground applications and is several 
times longer than any previously reported results.  Our system provided cryptographic quality secret key 
transfer with a number of secret bits per 1-s quantum transmission that would support practical cryptosystems 
such as the Advanced Encryption Standard, AES [26], or one-time pad encryption for short messages. (See 
Figure 6 for an example.) We have also developed a methodology that allows us to deduce the secrecy 
efficiency for other transmission distances, instrumental conditions, atmospheric properties and radiances by 
scaling the ηopt/C parameter from its 10-km values, and by noting that the quantity Psecret/ηopt is a function of 
µ and ηopt/C only. (See Figure 7.) First, since no secret bits can be produced for ηopt/C < (ηopt/C)min = 0.0016, 
we infer that free-space QKD would be feasible with this system, at reduced rates, over high-desert ground-
to-ground atmospheric paths of up to 15 km in full daylight, 30 km in reduced daylight (transmitter in 
shadow) and 45 km at night. Second, optimal secrecy efficiency is attained for µ ~ 0.5, independent of range 
and time-of-day when the USD and PNS eavesdropping possibilities are not considered. Third, our 
methodology allows us to infer the performance gains that could be expected from various instrumental 
changes. Implementation of fast pointing beam control at the transmitter is likely to increase the value of ηopt, 
and hence ηopt/C which would increase the number of secret bits that could be created per unit time at a given 
range and the systems maximum range. In contrast, although increasing the receiver aperture would also 
increase the value of ηopt, and hence the secret bit rate at a given range, it would not increase the maximum 
daylight range because the value of ηopt/C would be unchanged. This is because in daylight the quantity C is 
background dominated, and the increased receiver aperture would  increase this quantity in proportion to the 
increase in ηopt. However, an increased receiver aperture would increase the maximum range of our system at 
night, because C is then dominated by detector dark noise, which would not be altered by the aperture 
increase. The use of lower-noise SPDs would also allow higher secret bit yields and longer ranges at night 
because of the reduction in C and increase in ηopt/C. An improvement in the error correction efficiency would 
allow modest improvements in both the secret bit yield and range. Finally we believe that the methodology 
that we have developed for relating the overall system performance to instrumental and quantum channel 
properties may also be applicable to other QKD systems, including optical-fiber based ones.  
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Alice generates a secret random bit 
sequence
Alice transmits the sequence to Bob 
using the BB84 protocol
Bob reveals which photons he 
detected; Alice and Bob form their 
raw keys
Alice reveals her basis choices; Bob 
reveals on which detected photons 
he used the same basis; they form 
their sifted keys
Alice and Bob perform privacy 
amplification to produce an error-
free, final secret key
Alice and Bob correct Bobs errors, 
forming partially secret, error-free 
reconciled keys Psif→secret
Psif
Psecret
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. This figure shows the sequence of events in a QKD procedure leading to a cryptographic key shared 
by Alice and Bob on which they agree with overwhelming probability and on which Eve knows very much 
less than one bit of information. Also shown are three figures-of-merit for characterizing the process: Psif, 
which characterizes the efficiency with which sifted bits are produced from the initial bit sequence; Psif→secret, 
which characterizes the efficiency of extracting secret bits from the sifted bits; and Psecret, which characterizes 
the overall efficiency for generating final secret bits. (See text for details.) 
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Figure 2. The polarization optics of the QKD transmitter and receiver. The outputs of the data lasers (DL) in 
Alice are attenuated (average photon number µ < 1), their polarizations set to the BB84 values (shown as 
two-headed arrows) by linear polarizers (P), combined using beamsplitters (BS), passed through a spatial 
filter to erase spatial mode information (not shown), constrained by an interference filter (IF) to remove 
spectral information and then directed onto a BS. Photons transmitted through the BS are launched towards 
Bob, whereas those reflected are directed onto a single-photon detector (SPD) with a ~ 20 ns timing window, 
to monitor the µ-value of the launched data pulses. The relative timings of the DLs are matched to within the 
SPD timing jitter. At Bob data pulses pass through an IF and onto a BS where they are randomly transmitted 
or reflected. Along the reflected path, a data pulse's polarization is analyzed in the rectilinear basis, using a 
polarization controller (PC) and a polarizing beamsplitter (PBS). If one of the SPDs in the PBS output ports 
fires within the timing window (and no other SPD fires) Bob assigns a bit value to the data pulse. An 
analogous procedure occurs for data pulses taking the transmitted path where they are polarization analyzed 
according to Bobs conjugate (diagonal) basis. (We estimate that the probability for a photon produced in the 
SPD breakdown flash [27] to emerge from the receiver telescope is < 10-9.) Multi-detection events, in 
which more than one SPD fires, are recorded but not used for key generation. 
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Figure 3. A histogram of the efficiency with which sifted key bits were transferred (Psif) in 1-s quantum 
transmissions on 4 October, 2001 versus the average photon number µ and the atmospheric quantum channel 
parameter, ηopt/C, values and color-coded by the sifted key BER, ε. Several 1-s, 10-km transmissions are 
grouped into each vertical column. The solid lines are contours of constant sifted key BER, with their color 
indicating the corresponding ε value: the purple contour has ε = 0.5%; the green contour has ε = 5%; the 
yellow contour has ε = 7%; and the red contour has ε = 10%. The transmissions with ηopt/C < 0.01 were made 
in daylight. The transmission marked by the red arrow (File 331) is described in detail in Table 1. The 
transmissions marked with asterisks are PNS-safe night transmissions. (See text for details).  
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Figure 4. A surface plot showing the privacy amplification efficiency Psif→secret, with which secret bits can be 
extracted from a sifted key for our system, which is a function of two independent variables: the average 
photon number, µ, and the atmospheric quantum channel parameter, ηopt/C. The locations of 1-s, 10-km 
quantum transmissions from 4 October, 2001 are marked on this surface, which is color coded by the sifted 
key BER. The privacy amplification efficiency for other ranges and conditions is given by the point on this 
surface, whose location is specified by the ηopt/C value, which may be obtained by scaling from the 10-km 
values, and the average photon number, µ. Where Psif→secret drops to zero, no secret bits can be extracted from 
the sifted key. (See text for details.) 
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Figure 5. A histogram of the secrecy efficiency, Psecret, (the number of secret bits produced per transmitted 
bit) versus the average photon number, µ, and the atmospheric quantum channel parameter, ηopt/C, values 
color-coded by the sifted key BER, ε, of 1-s, 10-km quantum key transmissions on 4 October, 2001. Several 
1-s transmissions are grouped into each vertical column. The key transmission marked with the red arrow is 
described in Table 1. In the region below the red line no secret bits can be transferred with this system. For 
example, we see that a portion of our daylight data (with ηopt/C < 0.0016) lies in this region. Even though 
these transmissions yielded a large number of sifted bits (see Figure 3), no secret bits could be produced from 
them after reconciliation and privacy amplification (see Figure 4) because of the large amount of information 
about the reconciled key that Eve could have acquired from eavesdropping on the quantum transmissions and 
passively monitoring the public channel error correction transmissions between Alice and Bob. The night 
transmissions marked with asterisks are PNS-safe. (See text for details). 
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Figure 6. An example of secure communications using a one-time pad constructed from cryptographic key 
material produced by 10-km free-space QKD. The digital image at left, which shows two of the authors (RJH 
and CGP) standing next to the free-space QKD transmitter (Alice) at one end of the 10-km range, is 
composed of 140x94 12-bit color pixels. Each bit of the image was encrypted by XOR-ing it with a secret key 
bit produced by QKD to produce an encrypted image, which was then communicated to Bob over a public 
channel, requiring 157,920 key bits in total. Eve would not be able to discern the original image through the 
randomization introduced by the encryption, but Bob can recover the image by XOR-ing each bit of the 
encrypted image with the appropriate bit of his secret key. Alices and Bobs keys are represented as random 
images in which each pixel is the RGB representation of 12 bits of key. This one-time pad encryption is 
unconditionally secure but requires as many secret key bits as message bits. Practical cryptosystems would 
only need a few hundred secret key bits to encrypt large quantities of data. 
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Figure 7. A surface plot of the secrecy efficiency, Psecret, scaled by the atmospheric quantum channels 
efficiency, ηopt, versus the average photon number, µ, and the quantum channel parameter, ηopt/C, for our 
system. The locations of 1-s, 10-km quantum transmissions from 4 October, 2001 are marked on this surface, 
which is color coded by the sifted key BER. The data indicated by the red arrow (File 331) is described in 
detail in Table 1. The secrecy efficiency for other ranges and conditions is given by the point on this surface, 
whose location is specified by the ηopt/C value, which may be obtained by scaling from the 10-km values, and 
the average photon number, µ. 
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651-bit daylight 
sifted key with Bobs 
errors in red 
00000110011000100100000101101000011001110010001111100010001111001011
00100110000101001100110001010110110110111110001010100111110011111101
11111011110110111100001010010001001010110000110110000101100001001011
10010100111001010011111011100110000111000100001101110111000111000101
00100010011000110010110011110111111100000111101101100110000111001011
01001101001101001110101000101011000001010001110110111100111011011110
10011111001100101011010011100011100101010010100000110111100100100010
01111101111001001101001111001111001101100010001010111011001011111100
00011111110101101111010000011110011001011011101011011110001111010111
001000011000010101110010110110010110110 
Final 264-bit error-
free, secret daylight 
key 
11000000110000010100011101101000000110111110000010100111100100011111
11011111111110111100111110111100101111111000010010110100010000001111
11110111001100110111110111011110010100100101011111000101010011101011
01000001111010101101101000001111100010011111001101000111011101100110
0100011010101110000011011100011010001000110000100110011000 
 
 Table 1: Sifted and final secret keys from a 1-s daylight quantum key transmission at 18:40:26 MDT on 4 
October, 2001, which had an average photon number, µ = 0.29, and an atmospheric quantum channel efficiency, 
ηopt = 2.4%, resulting in 1,349 raw key bits, from which 651 bits were sifted, composed of 331 bits from the 
rectilinear basis and 320 bits from the diagonal basis. (The average photon numbers of each BB84 polarization 
state transmitted were, µ = 0.291, 0.288, 0.291, and 0.288 for the H, V, +45º, and -45º polarizations
respectively.) Bobs sifted key contains 21 errors (shown in red), corresponding to C ≈ 5, with 2 H errors (H 
transmitted but V received), 7 V errors, 7 +45º errors and 5 -45º errors, giving a sifted BER of
ε = 3.2%, which translates to a background radiance ~ 0.2 mW cm-2 µm-1 str-1. Alice and Bob estimate that Eves 
collision entropy on the sifted key is reduced from maximal by 40 bits to compensate for potential intercept-
resend eavesdropping in the Breidbart basis on single-photon events, and by 170 bits to compensate for potential 
eavesdropping on multi-photon events, to 440 bits. This is further reduced by 155 bits to compensate for side 
information revealed to correct Bobs errors, by 2 bits of side information corresponding to a slight 47/53-bias
towards 0s in the sifted key, and by a 20-bit safety factor to give a 264-bit final, error-free secret key on which 
Eves expected information is < 10-6 bits. During this transmission there was one multi-detector event, consistent 
with a data-background coincidence, which was discarded. We attribute the tendency for errors to cluster to 
atmospheric scintillation.   
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